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Abstract
In 2008, the United States subprime mortgage crisis sparked international financial
turmoil, with effects becoming particularly severe after the collapse of Lehman Brothers on
September 15. Due to their banks’ dependence on foreign funding, New Zealand’s money
market experienced significant friction spilling over from the United States and Europe.
Liquidity premiums rose, and interbank lending became increasingly restricted. Although
the crisis was not as severe in New Zealand as it was in many other countries, the problems
in the money market caused some level of financial strain. To combat the crisis, the
Minister of Finance announced on November 1, 2008, that the government would offer a
wholesale funding guarantee to investment-grade financial institutions with substantial
borrowing and lending in New Zealand. The program was intended to facilitate access to
international financial markets for New Zealand financial institutions in a time of risk
aversion for international investors. The program was administered as an opt-in system,
with eligible banks applying for a guarantee for each security for which they desired the
government backing. Participants were charged a fee for the guarantee, with the amount
determined by the riskiness of the issuer, the currency of issuance, and the maturity of the
loan. A total of five institutions made 24 guaranteed issuances worth $10.3 billion NZD
before the issuance window closed on April 30, 2010. There were no defaults, and $290
million NZD was collected from the program.
Keywords:

Wholesale funding guarantee, credit guarantee, New Zealand

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering the responses to the global financial crisis that pertain to bank debt guarantee
programs.
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New Zealand’s Wholesale Funding
Guarantee
At a Glance
The 2008 U.S. financial crisis caused
worldwide
financial
distress.
The
dependence of New Zealand banks on
foreign funding made them vulnerable to
this turmoil. Liquidity in the international
capital markets tightened significantly,
causing the New Zealand money market to
experience increased frictions. Interbank
lending became more and more rare as the
spread between interbank interest rates
and expectations of official rates gradually
rose.

Summary of Key Terms
Purpose: To facilitate access to international
financial markets for New Zealand financial
institutions in a time of risk aversion for
international investors.
Announcement Date

November 1, 2008

Operational Date

November 1, 2008

Date of First Guaranteed
Loan Issuance

February 19, 2009

Issuance Window
Expiration Date

Closed to new issuances
April 30, 2010

To facilitate access to international financial Program Size
Opt-in; Unspecified
markets for New Zealand financial Usage
$10.3 billion NZD
institutions, the Minister of Finance
($7.5 billion)
announced on November 1, 2008, that the
Outcomes
$290 million NZD in fees
government would offer a wholesale
collected. No defaults
funding guarantee to investment-grade
Notable Features
Fees lowered twice to
financial institutions with substantial
better reflect market
borrowing and lending in New Zealand. The
conditions and promote
program allowed eligible institutions to
usage
apply for guarantees for individual
securities. Participants were charged relatively high fees for the guarantees with the
intention of encouraging withdrawal from the program as soon as market conditions
returned to normal. The fee schedule (which was amended several times) depended on the
creditworthiness of the issuer and the maturity and currency of the issuance. Securities
could be guaranteed for up to five years, and participants were expected to commit to
lengthening the average maturity of their funding whenever possible.
The first eligibility certificate for the program was issued on February 19, 2009. A total of
five banks participated in the program with 24 guaranteed issuances worth a total of $10.3
billion NZD ($7.5 billion) being made. The government collected a net total of $290 million
NZD in fees from the program. The last guarantee was issued on February 12, 2010, and the
issuance window of the facility formally ended on April 30, 2010.
Summary Evaluation
While there has not been much evaluation done on the program itself, it saw significant use
by participating financial institutions and managed to generate hundreds of millions of
dollars in net revenue for the government.
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Wholesale Funding Guarantee: New Zealand Context
$135.1 billion in 2007
$135.5 billion in 2008

GDP
(SAAR, Nominal GDP
in LCU converted to
USD)

Source: Bloomberg
$32,511 in 2007
$31,290 in 2008

GDP per capita
(SAAR, Nominal GDP
in LCU converted to
USD)

Source: Bloomberg
As of Q4, 2007:

Sovereign credit
rating (5-year senior
debt)

Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
As of Q4, 2008:
Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA

Size of banking
system

Source: Bloomberg
$189.7 billion in total assets in 2007
$195.9 billion in total assets in 2008
Source: Bloomberg
140.5% in 2007
144.6% in 2008

Size of banking
system as a
percentage of GDP
Size of banking
system as a
percentage of
financial system
5-bank concentration
of banking system

Source: Bloomberg
Data not available.
Source: World Bank Global Financial
Development Database
94.5% of total banking assets in 2007
94.8% of total banking assets in 2008
Source: World Bank Global Financial
Development Database
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Foreign involvement
in banking system

Government
ownership of banking
system
Existence of deposit
insurance
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97.0% of total banking assets in 2007
96.0% of total banking assets in 2008
Source: World Bank Global Financial
Development Database
2% of banks owned by the state in 2008
Source: World Bank, Bank Regulation and
Supervision Survey
Limits on full coverage:
None by mid-September 2008
$710,120 by early December 2008
Source: OECD
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Overview

Background
In 2008, the Unites States subprime mortgage crisis destabilized the global financial
system, with effects becoming particularly severe after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in
mid-September. Due to the interconnectedness of the global financial system, New
Zealand’s money market experienced significant friction from spillovers from the United
States and Europe. At the time of the crisis, New Zealand banks were heavily dependent on
foreign funding. About 45 percent of their funding came from overseas capital markets
(New Zealand Investment Guide 2015). In New Zealand, liquidity premiums rose, and as a
result, interbank lending became more and more restricted. The spread between shortterm interbank interest rates and expectations of official rates crept up (Bollard 2009).
When these effects began to be felt, some finance companies outside the traditional
banking sector were already under pressure owing to credit weaknesses stemming from
their more aggressive lending practices. The failure rate among these institutions increased
as funding became more difficult to obtain. In the years before the introduction of New
Zealand’s guarantee schemes, 45 finance companies failed (Commerce Committee 2011).
In spite of these difficulties, New Zealand was not hit as hard by the crisis as many other
countries. The core of New Zealand’s financial system remained solid, notwithstanding the
failures that occurred outside the traditional banking sector. Money continued to flow
through New Zealand’s economy without the devastation of a liquidity freeze (Bollard
2009). Two guarantee programs were introduced to ensure depositors and investors
remained confident in a time of turmoil and uncertainty: the Wholesale Funding Guarantee,
which is the focus of this case, and the Retail Deposit Guarantee Scheme, which was
announced prior to the Wholesale Funding Guarantee on October 12, 2008.
Program Description
On November 1, 2008, the New Zealand Minister of Finance announced that the
government would offer the Wholesale Funding Guarantee to investment-grade financial
institutions in New Zealand. The program was intended to facilitate access to international
financial markets for New Zealand financial institutions in a time of risk aversion for
international investors. The Ministry also stated that the facility would be designed to
encourage withdrawal from the program as soon as markets return to normal. Sections
65ZD and 65ZG of the Public Finance Act of 1989 were cited as the legal basis for the
program.
The guarantee was meant to assure international investors that they would receive timely
repayment through the facility. The program was available to financial institutions with an
investment-grade credit rating of BBB- or better and that had substantial New Zealand
borrowing and lending operations (including branches of foreign banks). All newly issued
senior unsecured negotiable or transferable debt securities were eligible for a guarantee.
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The facility was offered on an opt-in basis by institution and instrument. Institutions that
sought to cover a security needed to apply for a guarantee eligibility certificate for a
proposed debt security liability.

The scheme covered the New Zealand dollar, Australian dollar, US dollar, euro, pound
sterling, Swiss franc, Japanese yen, Hong Kong dollar, and Singaporean dollar. Other
currencies were considered by application on a case by case basis. A guarantee fee was
charged for each issue with the level of the fee determined by the riskiness of the issuer,
the currency of the security, and the term of the security. The fee schedule was lowered
twice during the program, with the final version including fees ranging from 70 basis
points (bps) for short-term issuances by highly rated issuers to 200 bps longer-term
issuances by lower-rated issuers.
Guarantees covered securities to maturity or for up to five years from the time they were
issued, whichever came first. The government does not appear to have established
minimum maturity requirements for eligible debt. Participants in the program were not
allowed to have guarantees for debt larger than 125 percent of the total stock of eligible
types of debt on issue before the intensification of the crisis. This rule was the only limit
imposed on the amount of debt the government was willing to guarantee.
Participating institutions were required to commit to lengthening the average maturity of
their funding whenever possible. To ensure compliance, the government asserted an
intention to monitor the issuing activities of participants. Institutions were also required to
maintain a capital buffer to ensure that the capital position of the issuer would not be
depleted during the coverage period. The specified buffer was an additional 2 percent Tier
1 capital buffer, above the 4 percent regulatory minimum.
Outcomes
The first eligibility certificate for the program was issued on February 19, 2009, to the Bank
of New Zealand. In total, five institutions participated in the program: ANZ National Bank
Ltd, Bank of New Zealand, Westpac New Zealand Ltd, Kiwibank Ltd, and ASB Bank Ltd,
which were the five largest banks in New Zealand.
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Figure 1: Certificates issued to participating banks
Bank

Eligibility Certificates Issued

Bank of New Zealand

9

ANZ National Bank Ltd

8

Westpac New Zealand Ltd

6

Kiwibank Ltd

1

ASB Bank Ltd1

0

1 ASB Bank Ltd received a guarantee deed to participate but did not use any guarantees.

Source: New Zealand Treasury.
A total of 24 instruments were covered by the program (see Figure 1), worth about $10.3
billion NZD3. There were no defaults under the Wholesale Guarantee Scheme, and the New
Zealand government’s net gain was worth about $290 million NZD in fees (Reserve Bank of
NZ 2010). The last eligibility certificate was issued on February 11, 2010, to Westpac New
Zealand Limited Ltd, and the program formally ended on April 30, 2010.

II.

Key Design Decisions

1. The program was part of a package of measures introduced in late 2008 to help
stabilize the financial system and was linked with a guarantee on retail deposits.
In addition to the Wholesale Funding Guarantee Scheme, which was announced on
November 1, 2008, the government of New Zealand also announced the Retail Deposit
Guarantee scheme on October 12, 2008, which covered “all retail deposits of participating
New Zealand–registered banks as well as retail deposits by eligible depositors in nonbank
deposit-taking entities, including building societies, credit unions, and finance companies.”
Institutions seeking to participate in the Wholesale Funding Guarantee were expected to
have applied for a guarantee under the Retail Deposit Guarantee Scheme.
2. Legal authority for the scheme was derived from sections 65ZD and 65ZG of the
Public Finance Act of 1989.
New Zealand authorities were able to establish the scheme based on standing legal
authority provided in the Public Finance Act of 1989.

3

$7.5 billion ($1 USD = $1.36 NZD as of April 30, 2010).
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3. There was no explicit cap on the amount the government of New Zealand could
guarantee.
Program documents contained no cap on the amount of guaranteed debt that could be
issued pursuant to the scheme.
4. Financial institutions with “substantial New Zealand borrowing and lending
operations” (including branches of foreign banks) that possessed an investmentgrade credit rating (BBB– or higher) were eligible to participate in the scheme.
The purpose of the Wholesale Funding Guarantee Scheme was to re-establish access to
international funding markets, and New Zealand authorities expressed a belief that these
eligibility requirements would capture all institutions reliant on such markets in the years
leading up to the crisis. Authorities further noted that a small number of nonbank financial
companies would likely be eligible as well, but none participated.
Branches of foreign banks were eligible to participate in the Wholesale Funding Guarantee
Scheme given their significant role in New Zealand’s domestic bank bill market, but to help
ensure that the scheme wasn’t used to fund a branch’s wider group, foreign branches could
make guaranteed issuances only in New Zealand dollars.
There was also a requirement of an additional capital buffer, which was intended to protect
the government as guarantor. The buffer defended against the risk that the capital position
of financial institutions was depleted during the period of the guarantee. Guaranteed
“locally incorporated, registered” banks were required to maintain a Tier 1 capital buffer at
2 percent over the required minimum. If a bank failed to maintain the additional buffer, the
government would not issue any additional guarantees to that institution. Any non-bank
issuers would have their buffers assessed on a case by case basis (Reserve Bank of New
Zealand 2008).
5. All newly issued senior unsecured negotiable or transferable debt securities were
eligible for the guarantee scheme.
Any new issues of these instruments by eligible financial institutions were eligible for
coverage under the wholesale scheme. Ones targeted partly or wholly at retail investors
were also included.
6. Guaranteed securities could have any maturity, but the guarantee would last only
to maturity or up to five years, whichever came earliest.
New Zealand authorities had initially contemplated a three-year maximum guarantee term.
However, authorities became concerned that this would concentrate maturities and
preclude New Zealand institutions from accessing a substantial pool of investors interested
in longer maturities.
The government does not appear to have established minimum maturity requirements for
eligible debt.
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7. Currencies that were eligible were the New Zealand dollar, Australian dollar, US
dollar, euro, pound sterling, the Swiss Franc, Japanese yen, Hong Kong dollar, and
the Singaporean dollar.
Other currencies could be included but had to be applied for and were considered on a case
by case basis.
8. Participants in the program were not allowed to have guarantees for debt larger
than 125 percent of the total stock of eligible types of debt on issue prior to the
intensification of the crisis.
This figure was the stated limit on guarantee coverage for New Zealand financial
institutions. The limit was intended to protect the government against the risk that banks
attempt to increase their funding solely on the basis of the guarantee. The constraint was
also designed to protect against the risk that NZD issuance by New Zealand branches of
foreign banks under the guarantee might be used to fund the activities of the broader
groups.
9. Guarantee fees were based on issuer creditworthiness, maturity, and currency,
and were lowered twice in response to market conditions.
New Zealand authorities intended the guarantee fees to facilitate access to the scheme as
long as market conditions remained difficult, while encouraging a return to nonguaranteed issuance as soon as market conditions improved. Fees were lower for securities
with shorter terms reflecting the lower market prices for credit risk on loans of shorter
maturity. Riskier loans warranted significantly higher fees than more secure ones, to cover
the risk of default. Guarantees for loans in NZD were more expensive than ones in other
currencies, reflecting the stated purpose of the facility to increase New Zealand institutions’
access to international capital markets.
Authorities concluded that the initial fee schedule associated with the Wholesale Funding
Guarantee Scheme resulted in fees that were too high. Shortly before the program launched,
an initial modification to the schedule reduced the fees associated with short-term
issuances by 15 bps to better reflect normal market pricing and to more closely match the
fees charged by other countries (particularly Australia). Then, in January 2009, with no
guaranteed issuances having yet been made, New Zealand reduced the fee for short-term
issuances a further 15 bps and cut the fee for longer-term issuances by 50 bps. The stated
rationale for these cuts was the high cost of issuing even guaranteed debt. Authorities also
noted the fact that the fees as reduced were more in line with other countries’ fees.
The final fee schedule associated with the program is shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Fee Schedule

Credit Rating of issuer

One Year or less
(bps per annum)

More than one year
(bps per annum)
NZD

AA- and above

non-NZD

70

90

70

A- to A+

130

150

130

BBB- to BBB+

180

200

180

10. Participating institutions were required to commit to lengthening the average
maturity of their funding whenever possible.
This commitment was intended to protect against the risk that banks might attempt to
concentrate issuances in short-term maturities, for which the guarantee fee was lower. To
enforce the rule, the government stated an intent to closely monitor the issuing activity of
participants. Furthermore, the government retained the power to adjust the pricing
structure of the guarantee to potentially counteract any maturity concentration.
11. No deadline for issuing guaranteed debt was established at the outset of the
program; authorities ultimately closed the issuance window on April 30, 2010.
New Zealand viewed its fee structure as precluding the need for a pre-established deadline
on guaranteed issuance, with its emphasis on imposing costs that would make guaranteed
issuance prohibitively expensive once conditions improved. In response to such
improvements and based on the observation that institutions were again able to access
funding without resort to the guarantee, authorities announced on April 30, 2010, that no
new guarantees issuances could be made.

IV.

Evaluation

There has been little evaluation of the Wholesale Funding Guarantee. However, with 24
guarantees issued, the program seems to have aided New Zealand financial institutions in
accessing international capital markets. The fee schedule was adjusted several times in
response to the government’s belief that high fees may be discouraging usage. Usage
increased after fee schedule adjustments, particularly after the first adjustment, suggesting
these decisions accomplished their goal (Wanganui Chronicle 2010). A total of $10.3 billion
NZD in loans were guaranteed, reflecting significant usage of and benefit from the program.
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